

French Algeria and British Northern Ireland

Timothy Durbin, MEDPROS Readiness Coordinator, ASM Research, Inc., Fort Carson, Colorado—I really liked Lieutenant Colonel James D. Campbell's article "French Algeria and British Northern Ireland: Legitimacy and the Rule of Law in Low-Intensity Conflict" (March-April 2005), but I see one problem: the handing over of suspects from military control to civilian control. It may have worked for the British in Ireland because the police and civilian leadership were and are willing to use law enforcement means which have the backing of a large majority of the population. The Irish people are a homogenous group. The Irish people were not formed into a country by an outside force like the Iraqi people were, although Northern Ireland is ruled by the British.

The British formed Iraq and grouped different tribal, ethnic, and religious groups under one flag. Iraq would be different if it was formed from within, similar to the way America was formed. Saddam Hussein held the country together artificially through military force in the same way the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia was held together. Once the force no longer restrained the people, they were free to splinter into their own groups, which they promptly did. Sometimes violent means were used, as in the case of the former Yugoslavian Balkan states, or peacefully, like happened in the former Soviet states because they were allowed to revert back to their own independent countries by the Russian leadership, except, of course, in Chechnya, and we can see what is happening there. What we are doing now is trying to uphold what the British put in place and Saddam maintained for as long he did.

Many in the Iraqi civilian ranks conduct business similar to the way

Saddam did—with torture, brutality, and killings based on the tribal, regional, or ethnic background. Handing over suspects to civilians with unknown grudges against other groups may actually do more to fan the flames of civil war than just keeping them under our own custody. (The United States has lost a lot of credibility because of [the] Abu Graib [prison scandal and the] failure to hold almost no high-ranking [leaders], either military or civilian, responsible.)

Letting Iraq splinter along its ethnic and religious groups would probably make it easier for each group to govern themselves, although [doing so] would upset neighbors like Turkey, who hate Kurds, and Sunni Saudis, who hate Shi'ites. We are already beginning to see this fractionalization in the new constitution being written. Forcing [the groups] to work together may work while our military is there, but without that stabilizing force my guess is there is a high probability the different groups will resort to violence to achieve what they can't achieve through political means.

Marketing and Information Operations

Major Chad Storlie, U.S. Army Reserve, Marketing Director, Union Pacific Railroad, Adjunct Professor of Marketing, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska—From December 2002 through October 2003, in support of OIF, I served as a Ground Planner and the Current Plans Director for Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force West and Combined Joint Special Task Force-Arabian Peninsula.

I commend Captain Stoney Trent and Captain James L. Doty III in their attempt to relate aspects of marketing to Information Operations (IO) in their article, "Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations" (July-August 2005). However, in marketing terminology, the fundamental failure of the U.S. Army's market-

ing campaign (Information Operations) in Iraq has been the failure to understand and meet the underlying needs of the target market—the Iraqi population. Trent and Doty's article misses the crucial importance of the military operation (in marketing terms, the product) itself in their comparison of marketing to Information Operations. A marketing campaign, just like an IO campaign, cannot be successful if the product it is promoting fails to meet the underlying need of the population. A product must be able to satisfy the target market.

On an academic level, marketing is "the process of planning and executing the conception, pricing, promotion, and distribution of ideas, goods, services, organizations, and events to create and maintain relationships that will satisfy individual and organizational objectives" (Louis E. Boone and David L. Kurtz, *Contemporary Marketing*, Mason, OH: South-Western, 2005). On a fundamental level, marketing is the process that satisfies an individual's unmet needs with a good or service that satisfies the need. A simple way to understand the marketing process is to look at the marketing mix of product, price, place, and promotion.

For example, a consumer needs a drink with more sustenance than water for optimum athletic performance. Following detailed research on the target market, a firm creates a *product* that restores electrolytes, carbohydrates, and so on and, thus, improves an athlete's performance. A *price* is set to make the product available to the majority of the target market that satisfies the capital returns for the firm. The drink is sold in *places*, such as gyms and stores, the target market frequents, and the drink is *promoted* in such a manner to appeal to the target market's physical needs. When all of these elements align, a satisfied customer is created and the need is satisfied.

In Iraq, the security and stability product the United States is offering does not meet the needs of the Iraqi population. The U.S. Army's IO campaign—through its portrayal of success—further alienates the population. In marketing, problems arise when the brand and the message promoting a product do not align with the product's ability to satisfy the target market's unmet need. An example would be the hypothetical promotion of the Yugo car (circa 1983) as a symbol of luxury, superior quality, and high performance. This message would be received with contempt from consumers, but it is the very same message the U.S. Army is sending to Iraq.

In Iraq, U.S. Army Information Operations have been hamstrung by a poor product—the overall ineffectiveness of U.S. military operations to satisfy the needs of the Iraqi population for security and stability. Furthermore, the overly concentrated message that the Iraqis were receiving a quality product of security and stability further increases the chasm between Iraqi perceptions and reality. When the messages promoting a brand and product do not match the target market's perception of the product's quality, then that target market has been and will continue to be alienated. Trent and Doty's point that the U.S. Army needs to emulate

commercial advertisers will only further exacerbate this gulf in perceived product quality. In this case, a "slicker" copy of coalition activities in Iraq will only magnify the shortcomings.

Trent and Doty make good tactical points on the importance of thorough research into target populations and groups, integrating messages at all levels so themes match the specific target audience in the identified geographic area and that all levels of command are unified in the messages they promote. On a more fundamental level, however, the message that Information Operations portrays to target populations has to effectively match the perceived value of the product the military operation is producing for the target population. Coalition exhortations of the number of schools built, hospitals restored, and so on, do nothing to satisfy the still-existing need of the Iraqi population for security and infrastructure restoration (power, water, sewage, and such). In central Iraq, the population has been consistently frustrated on perceived and actual failures in coalition effectiveness to maintain security and deliver promised infrastructure improvements. Improved coalition advertising of a poor product in the Iraqi's minds will only continue a poor IO campaign.

For Information Operations and U.S. Army operations to truly adopt a marketing perspective, they need to ensure the message is tailored effectively to the value the product is producing or satisfying in the target population. Information Operations should adopt a process in line with the marketing mix. For example, using the marketing mix as a guideline, we see that the lines of operation become the key *product* that serves to satisfy the unmet population need. The area of operation becomes the *place* to deliver the product to the target population, and population commitment becomes the *price* the Army needs to deliver the product. In these terms, as with most commercial products, consumers desire the lowest price (that is, the level of commitment) for the highest quality of product. Information Operations serve as the *promotion* to relay the

message of the value and quality of the product to meet the unmet population need. As with consumer product marketing, this model only works when there is a firm level of commitment to quality and to honesty in the assessment of how well the product actually satisfies the unmet target market need in the opinion of the target market.

For marketers, the commercial measure of success is a continued exchange of the product to the target market. This continued exchange represents the creation of a relationship between the firm and the target market in proportion to the satisfaction of this once unmet consumer need. As long as customers continue to purchase the product, there is a successful implementation of the marketing mix. In a perfect marketing world, unsatisfied consumers lead to an opportunity for satisfied, long-term customers.

The U.S. Army needs to adopt this same process in treating target populations as the target market for U.S. military operations. Successful military operations will create satisfied target populations, which will support the establishment of a long-term relationship. A successful military-target population relationship that continues to meet the needs of the target population will grow the level of personal commitment to the product (in Trent and Doty's example, the United States). It is this level of personal commitment that allows commercial firms to grow and maintain strong brands and that will allow the coalition in Iraq to create a foundation of support to battle against the insurgency.

Reply: Marketing

Captain Stoney Trent, U.S. Army, and Captain James L. Doty III, U.S. Army—We conceive of marketing as a cognitive metaphor, or organizing concept, for understanding Information Operations (IO). Our article attempted to avoid narrowing our proposal only to the conflict in Iraq as we chose to illustrate the historic need for marketing principles in all Information Operations. That said, Major Chad Storlie submits an excellent illustration of how the marketing metaphor is
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Corrections

In the May-June 2005 article, "Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units," the author's byline should read: Sergeant First Class Robert Ehrlich. The title for figure 6, page 85, should read: "Heavy Indirect-Fire Platoon Structure."

On page 69 of Theo Neethling's May-June 2005 article, "Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects," the quote should read: "[t]here are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go."